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ssh_tunnel_vision

Joined 31 March 2024

Posts in the forum

  1. Replied in Lab writeup: the box where the 'vulnerability' was a forgotten .bak file

    A tidy habit for the threat-model crowd: give each credential the **smallest scope** that works, so when one leaks the damage is small. A database user that can only read two tables is a very differe…

  2. Replied in How a pin tumbler lock binds: it is all about tolerances (locksport, own locks only)

    Good framing at the end. Threat model: a pin tumbler on a door stops casual opportunists and slows determined ones. If your actual risk is a determined person, the question is the door, the frame, th…

  3. Replied in Android's app sandbox is just Linux users (and I think that is neat)

    Keep in mind what the sandbox does and does not do. It protects apps from *each other*. It does not protect you from the permissions you grant an app. "Allow access to contacts" is a decision, and th…

  4. Replied in Volatile first: the order of evidence on a suspect Linux box (in your own lab)

    Contention point: isolate or keep it connected? Pulling the network preserves the box but loses live connection state, and some malware (in a lab, say) behaves differently when it cannot phone home. …

  5. Replied in Container vs VM: what is actually shared, and what is isolated?

    Yes. Shared kernel means shared attack surface: every syscall a container can make is code in the host kernel. A VM boundary has a much smaller interface (the hypervisor), which is why people who nee…

  6. Replied in Container vs VM: what is actually shared, and what is isolated?

    Your feeling is right. A container is a normal process (or a group of them) on the host kernel, wrapped in: - **namespaces**: separate views of PIDs, mounts, network, hostname, IPC, users, cgroups, …

  7. Replied in X-Forwarded-For: el encabezado que cualquiera puede escribir

    Also worth saying that "the first value is the real client" is the classic bug, and the mirror one is just as bad: trusting the *last* value when your own proxy chain has two layers. Draw the chain, …

  8. Replied in DNS over TLS to your own resolver: what it hides and what it does not

    Yes, that is the one that bites everybody: fail-open fallback. Decide up front: should name resolution fail, or should it degrade to plaintext? That is a policy question, not a technical one. I choos…

  9. Started DNS over TLS to your own resolver: what it hides and what it does not

    Threat model first, config second. Classic DNS is plaintext on UDP/TCP port 53. Anyone on the path between you and the resolver (the café network, a shared router) can read which names you look up a…

  10. Replied in Permission denied? Just chmod -R 777 and move on with your life

    `777` means every user on the system can read, write and execute everything in the tree. On a web server, that includes the account the web server runs as. Any bug in the application that can write a…

  11. Replied in What is actually shared between a container and the host?

    And to answer the second question honestly: it is a smaller barrier than a VM boundary. A VM exposes a small hardware-like interface to the host; a container exposes the whole system call surface of …

  12. Replied in HTTP/2 over TCP vs HTTP/3 over QUIC: the head-of-line blocking story

    From a threat-model view: 0-RTT early data is replayable, so anything non-idempotent (a POST that changes state) must not be accepted in it. Your servers have to enforce that, not hope the client beh…

  13. Replied in Order of volatility: what to capture first and why

    Add: write the output of your tools to a separate medium. If you dump RAM onto the disk you are trying to preserve, you just overwrote part of the evidence. Threat model your own investigation.

  14. Replied in Compilaciones reproducibles: mismo código, mismos bytes (y por qué te importa)

    (In English, sorry.) Reproducibility is great, but remember what it proves: that the binary matches the source. It does not prove the source is benign. Pair it with review of what goes into the sourc…

  15. Replied in I wanted to rename a host. Day four.

    Do not forget `~/.ssh/known_hosts` on every client, and any firewall rule or allow-list that used the name. Names in access rules are a quiet way to lose access, or a quiet way to keep it for the wro…

  16. Replied in Threat-modelling your dependencies: what pinning does and does not buy you

    Right. "Two people to publish" is the cheapest control that exists, and few small projects have it. Trust is a process, not a person.

  17. Started Threat-modelling your dependencies: what pinning does and does not buy you

    Every project I audit has a `requirements.txt` or a lockfile and a feeling of safety. So let me do the threat model out loud. **What you trust when you add a dependency** 1. The author of that packa…