Bayes' rule is the arithmetic of changing your mind. Here is the smallest example I know that surprises people.
A café buys bagels from two bakeries. Bakery A supplies 80% of them and burns 1% of its bagels. Bakery B supplies 20% and burns 5%. You open a bag and find a burnt bagel. Which bakery most likely made it?
Intuition says A, because A supplies most of them. The calculation:
prior <- c(A = 0.8, B = 0.2) # share of the supply
burnt <- c(A = 0.01, B = 0.05) # P(burnt | bakery)
post <- prior * burnt / sum(prior * burnt)
round(post, 3)
# A B
# 0.444 0.556
Posterior: B is now more likely than A, 55.6% to 44.4%. The evidence ("burnt") is five times more likely under B, which beats A's 4-to-1 advantage in supply.
Two takeaways. First, you must hold both numbers in your head: how common each cause is (the prior) and how well each cause explains what you saw (the likelihood). People tend to use only one. Second, the answer is a belief, not a certainty. One more burnt bagel and you update again.